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a b s t r a c t 
The deployment of pervasive information and communication technologies (ICTs) within 
smart city initiatives transforms cities into extraordinary apparatuses of data capture. ICTs 
such as smart cameras, sound sensors and lighting technology are trying to infer and affect 
persons’ interests, preferences, emotional states, and behaviour. It should be no surprise 
then that contemporary legal and policy debates on privacy in smart cities are dominated 
by a debate focused on data and, therefore, on data protection law. In other words, data pro- 
tection law is the go-to legal framework to regulate data processing activities within smart 
cities and similar initiatives. While this may seem obvious, a number of important hurdles 
might prevent data protection law to be (successfully) applied to such initiatives. In this con- 
tribution, we examine one such hurdle: whether the data processed in the context of smart 
cities actually qualifies as personal data, thus falling within the scope of data protection 
law. This question is explored not only through a theoretical discussion but also by taking 
an illustrative example of a smart city-type initiative – the Stratumseind 2.0 project and its 
living lab in the Netherlands (the Stratumseind Living Lab; SLL). Our analysis shows that the 
requirement of ‘identifiability’ might be difficult to satisfy in the SLL and similar initiatives. 
This is so for two main reasons. First, a large amount of the data at stake do not qualify 
as personal data, at least at first blush. Most of it relates to the environment, such as, data 
about the weather, air quality, sound and crowding levels, rather than to identified or even 
likely identifiable individuals. This is connected to the second reason, according to which, 
the aim of many smart city initiatives (including the SLL) is not to identify and target specific 
individuals but to manage or nudge them as a multiplicity – a combination of the environ- 
ment, persons and all of their interactions. This is done by trying to affect the ‘atmosphere’ 
on the street. We thus argue that a novel type of profiling operations is at stake; rather than 
relying on individual or group profiling, the SLL and similar initiatives rely upon what we 
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have called ‘atmospheric profiling’. We conclude that it remains highly uncertain, whether 
smart city initiatives like the SLL actually process personal data. Yet, they still pose risks for 
a wide variety of rights and freedoms, which data protection law is meant to protect, and a 
need for regulation remains. 
© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) 
1. Introduction 
Smart city initiatives – generally referring to the extensive em- 
bedding of software-enabled technologies into the city envi- 
ronment – are by now an obligatory feature of almost any 
city or town in the developed world, including Europe. The 
contemporary city is increasingly built of pervasive informa- 
tion and communication technologies (ICTs), including digi- 
tal cameras, sound, smell and other sensors, adaptive lighting, 
and wifi tracking technology. Within the smart city discourse, 
such technologies serve two broad purposes: improving urban 
management and the quality of life in the city (such as, lower- 
ing gas emissions, traffic congestion and crime) and stimulat- 
ing the economic development of the city.1 However, beyond 
the grand promises of the smart city discourse, data-driven 
monitoring practices of ICTs transform cities into extraordi- 
nary apparatuses of data capture, trying to infer and affect per- 
sons’ interests, preferences, emotional states, and behaviour. 
People are thus subjected to much greater levels of scrutiny 
and control as increasing aspects of their daily lives are cap- 
tured as data.2 
It should be no surprise then that contemporary legal and 
policy debates on privacy in smart cities and similar ini- 
tiatives, such as living labs, are dominated by a debate fo- 
cused on data and, therefore, on data protection law.3 In other 
words, data protection law is the go-to legal framework to reg- 
ulate data processing activities within smart cities and liv- 
ing labs. While data protection law seems to be the obvi- 
ous legal framework to regulate smart cities, it might actu- 
ally have serious trouble with regulating smart city-type ini- 
tiatives due to several normative and practical arguments. 
For instance, Hildebrandt has argued that data protection 
law is not equipped to deal with real-time and continuous 
profiling in ambient environments (which smart cities and 
living labs aspire to be), as it does not offer real-time pro- 
1 Rob Kitchin, ‘The promise and perils of smart cities’ (2015) So- 
ciety for Computers Law ; ‘Barcelona Smart City’; ‘Amsterdam Smart 
City’; European Commission, ‘Smart Cities: Cities Using Techno- 
logical Solutions to Improve the Management and Efficiency of the 
Urban Environment’. 
2 Rob Kitchin, ‘The Ethics of Smart Cities and Urban Science’ 
(2016) 374 Philosophical Transactions A. 
3 Lorenzo Dalla Corte, Bastiaan van Loenen and Colette Cuijpers, 
‘Personal Data Protection as a Nonfunctional Requirement in the 
Smart City’s Development’, 13th International conference on internet, 
law & politics, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Barcelona, 29-30 June 
2017 (2017); Lilian Edwards, ‘Privacy, Security and Data Protection 
in Smart Cities: A Critical EU Law Perspective’ (2016) 2 European 
data protection law review 28. 
tection.4 Furthermore, smart cities are commonly formed in 
complex public-private partnerships (PPPs) including numer- 
ous projects, goals and actors, where data is processed both 
for commercial and law enforcement purposes. Yet, the dual 
regime of the General Data Protection Regulation and the Law 
Enforcement Directive has been said to result in a muddled re- 
lationship, complicating the attribution of responsibility and 
thus hindering the capacity of data protection law to effec- 
tively regulate data processing within such partnerships.5 Fi- 
nally, following the advances in data-driven technology, there 
has recently been a renewed academic interest in the ques- 
tion of what constitutes personal data. Some scholars have 
convincingly argued that the material scope of EU data protec- 
tion law has grown so broad that ‘literally any data can plau- 
sibly be argued to be personal’.6 Others have pointed to the 
lack of clarity and the inconsistency surrounding the notion 
of anonymous data, and hence the extremely uncertain and 
probabilistic nature of the concept of identifiability.7 As Ed- 
wards put it, what constitutes personal data is still one of the 
central causes of doubt in the current data protection regime,8 
an issue that is exacerbated in the smart city context. 
In this contribution, we further these discussions and cri- 
tiques of data protection law by exploring whether and to 
what extent data protection law could apply to smart city- 
types of initiatives, particularly those that include a focus 
on safety and public order types of issues. In fact, public 
safety and security are often a key driver when considering 
investment in particular smart city technologies, since safe 
4 Mireille Hildebrandt, ‘A Vision of Ambient Law’ in Roger 
Brownsword and Karen Yeung (eds), Regulating Technologies 
(Bloomsbury 2008); Mireille Hildebrandt and Bert-Jaap Koops, ‘The 
Challenges of Ambient Law and Legal Protection in the Profiling 
Era’ (2010) 73 Modern Law Review 428. 
5 Nadezhda Purtova, ‘Between the GDPR and the Police Directive: 
Navigating through the Maze of Information Sharing in Public- 
Private Partnerships’ (2018) 8 International Data Privacy Law 52; 
Orla Lynskey, ‘Criminal Justice Profiling and EU Data Protection 
Law: Precarious Protection from Predictive Policing’ (2019) 15 In- 
ternational Journal of Law in Context 162; Catherine Jasserand, 
‘Law Enforcement Access to Personal Data Originally Collected 
by Private Parties: Missing Data Subjects’ Safeguards in Directive 
2016/680?’ (2018) 34 Computer Law and Security Review 154. 
6 Nadezhda Purtova, ‘The Law of Everything. Broad Concept of 
Personal Data and Future of EU Data Protection Law’ (2018) 10 Law, 
Innovation and Technology 40. 
7 Michèle Finck and Frank Pallas, ‘They Who Must Not Be Identi- 
fied — Distinguishing Personal from Non-Personal Data under the 
GDPR’ (2020) 10 International Data Privacy Law 1. 
8 Lilian Edwards, ‘Data Protection: Enter the General Data Protec- 
tion Regulation’ in Lilian Edwards (ed), Law, Policy and the Internet 
(Hart Publishing 2018). 
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(smart) cities are worth investing in.9 We thus ask the ques- 
tion, whether the data processed in this context could qualify 
as personal so as to trigger the application of data protection 
law. We posit that it remains highly uncertain, whether a large 
part of such smart city operations could actually fall within 
the scope of the data protection. This is so for two main rea- 
sons. First, a large amount of the data collected within smart 
city initiatives does not qualify as personal data, at least at 
first blush. Most of it relates to the environment, such as, 
data about the weather, air quality, sound and crowding levels, 
rather than to identified or (likely) identifiable individuals.10 
Moreover, the aim of many smart city initiatives, particularly 
in Europe, is not to identify and target specific individuals but 
to manage or nudge them as a multiplicity – a combination of 
the environment, persons and all of their interactions.11 Fol- 
lowing real-time algorithmic decisions, smart environments 
namely alter themselves so as to indirectly influence people’s 
behaviour.12 Consequently, persons do not need to be identi- 
fied or identifiable at all. 
In order to substantiate these theoretical claims, we of- 
fer a context-specific analysis of the possibilities for appli- 
cation of EU data protection law to a concrete example of a 
smarty city-type initiative with a focus on safety and secu- 
rity – the Stratumseind 2.0 project and its living lab ( Stratum- 
seind Living Lab; SLL ) in the Netherlands. Touted as a success by 
national and supra-national authorities,13 this longer-lasting 
mid-sized project, which includes both multinational and lo- 
cal technology companies, is an illustrative example of a Eu- 
ropean smart city-type initiative. Despite all of the scholarly 
attention, the concept of personal data has as yet not been 
studied in connection to a concrete example of a smart city 
initiative.14 Given the increasing role that smart cities play in 
shaping our experience in urban public space – including lim- 
9 Brunilda Pali and Marc Schuilenburg, ‘Fear and Fantasy in the 
Smart City’ (2019) Critical Criminology; Maroš Lacinák and Jozef 
Ristvej, ‘Smart City, Safety and Security’ (2017) 192 Procedia Engi- 
neering 522. 
10 Purtova (n 6). 
11 Marc Schuilenburg and Rik Peeters, ‘Smart Cities and the 
Architecture of Security: Pastoral Power and the Scripted 
Design of Public Space’ (2018) 5 City, Territory and Ar- 
chitecture; Dorine Duives, Stephvan Beffers and Mau- 
rits van Hövell, ‘Crowdmonitoring Systeem Amsterdam’ 
(2016) < https://www.noord-holland.nl/Actueel/Tijdelijk/ 
Symposium _ Samen _ slimmer _ reizen _ in _ de _ MRA/Documenten/ 
deelsessie _ 12 _ Crowdmonitoring _ systeem _ Amsterdam.pdf> 
accessed 6 May 2020. 
12 Sofia Ranchordás, ‘Nudging Citizens through Technology in 
Smart Cities’ (2019) 0 International Review of Law, Computers and 
Technology 1. 
13 ‘Eindhovense Innovatie Is Voorbeeld Voor de Rest 
van Het Land, Staatssecretaris Brengt Bezoek Aan Stra- 
tumseind’ ( Studio 040 , 2018) < https://archief.studio040.nl/ 
eindhovense-innovatie- is- voorbeeld- voor- de- rest- van- het- land- 
staatssecretaris-brengt-bezoek-aan-stratumseind/content/ 
item?1109883 > accessed 6 May 2020; ‘Context Broker’s Smart 
Services Are Making the City of Eindhoven a Safer Place’ 
< https://ec.europa.eu/cefdigital/wiki/display/CEFDIGITAL/2019/ 
06/07/Context+Broker%27s+smart+services+are+making+the+ 
city+of+Eindhoven+a+safer+place > accessed 6 May 2020. 
14 Although some issues connected to personal data have been 
discussed in relation to a concrete example; e.g. Liesbet van Zoo- 
iting our privacy and other fundamental rights and freedoms 
– there is a pressing need for exposing the contours of the con- 
cept of personal data in this particular context. 
The structure of the paper is the following. First, we de- 
scribe the Stratumseind 2.0 initiative, its living lab ( SLL ), and two 
of its sub-projects relating to predictive policing and nudg- 
ing: CityPulse and De-escalate . In the third part, we address the 
scope of personal data by focusing on the two key elements 
of its definition: ‘relating to’ and ‘identifiability’. We explore 
the meaning of information ‘relating to’ by applying it to the 
SLL example. We then investigate the notion of identifiability 
from a legal and technical perspective, followed by an analy- 
sis of the notion of identifiability through the lens of profiling. 
Based on this discussion, the last section examines the type 
of profiling and nudging found in the SLL , which we refer to 
as ‘atmospheric profiling’. We conclude that it remains diffi- 
cult to give a clear-cut answer as to whether the SLL example 
processes data, particularly in relation to the goal of affect- 
ing the atmosphere. Even more so, the notion of atmospheric 
profiling puts an additional strain to the concept of personal 
data, and therefore renders the application of data protection 
law to smart cities all the more uncertain. Furthermore, be- 
yond these issues related to the material scope of data protec- 
tion, there are other structural hurdles that stand in the way 
of its proper application to contemporary smart cities environ- 
ments organised within complex public-private partnerships. 
2. Stratumseind 2.0 and its living lab 15 
Stratumseind is a busy nightlife street in the centre of Eind- 
hoven, promoting itself as the longest nightlife street in the 
Netherlands. It is about four-hundred metres long and houses 
around fifty establishments, such as pubs, cafés, snack bars, 
a nightclub and a coffee shop, where marihuana is sold for 
personal consumption. It has been a popular nightlife des- 
tination, attracting a diverse and young public, for several 
decades. According to Eindhoven municipality, however, the 
number of visitors has been significantly dropping since 2010, 
arguably due to the rising criminality and vandalism on the 
street, giving Stratumseind a bad image.16 In 2013, the mu- 
nicipality thus initiated the Stratumseind 2.0 project, which 
officially ran until mid-2018 (although some of the projects 
seem to be continuing with several of the same parties still in 
2020).17 Stratumseind 2.0 was an umbrella project in the form of 
a public-private partnership (PPP) between Eindhoven munic- 
ipality, the police and a range of private parties, including the 
Stratumseind establishments association, real-property own- 
ers on the Stratumseind street, and Dutch breweries.18 While 
nen, ‘Privacy Concerns in Smart Cities’ (2016) 33 Government in- 
formation quarterly 472. 
15 Description based on Maša Gali ̌c, Surveillance and privacy in 
smart cities and living labs: conceptualising privacy for public space 
(doctoral dissertation; Optima Grafische Communicatie 2019). 
16 Eugene van Gerwen, ‘Stratumseind 2.0: Plan van Aanpak’ (2013) 
< https://eindhoven.raadsinformatie.nl/document/1047462/1/ 
document > accessed 20 August 2020. 
17 ‘The Stratumseind Pilot’ (2020) < https://oddity.ai/blog/ 
stratumseind-pilot/ > accessed on 16 September 2020. 
18 Grolsch, Heineken, Bavaria and the InBev conglomerate. 
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the notion of PPP has been defined in many ways, we use 
the broad definition by Savas, understanding a PPP as ‘any 
arrangement between government and the private sector in 
which partially or traditionally public activities are performed 
by the public sector’.19 This definition includes not only long- 
term cooperation between public and private parties but also 
short-term and ad hoc cooperation, which is the case in the 
Stratumseind 2.0 project. 
The main objective of Stratumseind 2.0 was to ‘long- 
lastingly improve the street from an economic as well as a 
social point of view’.20 More concretely, the project wanted to 
attract more visitors, make them stay longer and spend more 
money in the establishments, lower the vandalism, police and 
health-related costs in connection to Stratumseind, increase 
the income related to Stratumseind and Eindhoven as a whole 
and create positive value of direct marketing.21 These am- 
bitious goals were planned to be achieved through a variety 
of means and initiatives, especially through ‘a 365 days, 24/7 
scan of all data on Stratumseind ’.22 The key element and the 
main sub-project of Stratumseind 2.0 was thus its living lab –
the Stratumseind Living Lab ( SLL ). 
The SLL has been described as a field lab with a variety of 
sensors mostly located on the Stratumseind street and nu- 
merous actors, with the intention of measuring, analysing 
and stimulating the behaviour of people in public places.23 
Its main goal was to gain insight into the ways in which ex- 
ternal stimuli can (substantially) influence the escalating as 
well as de-escalating behaviour of visitors of the street.24 Like 
Stratumseind 2.0 , the SLL was also organised in the form of a 
PPP, involving a large and growing number of actors. On the 
one hand, public actors included Eindhoven municipality, the 
police and local higher education institutions, including the 
Technical University Eindhoven and Tilburg University. On the 
other hand, various technology companies, global and large 
(multinationals such as Philips, Atos and Cisco) as well as lo- 
cal and small businesses (like Sorama and Vinotion), were the 
main private actors involved. 
The SLL entailed a ‘basecamp’ – a physical location on the 
Stratumseind street, where big screens visualised the real- 
time collection and analysis of various types of data. The SLL 
included numerous sensors and actuators that were mostly 
positioned on the Stratumseind street, including: video and 
sound cameras with embedded analytical capabilities, special 
lighting and olfactory (emitting smells) technology, CityBea- 
cons,25 wifi tracking, technology for social media sentiment 
19 ES Savas, Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships (Chatham 
House 2000). 
20 van Gerwen (n 16). 
21 Tinus Kanters, ‘Living Lab, Onderdeel van Stratumseind 2.0, 
Smart Sensors, Smart Interfaces, Smart Actors, Smart Lights, 
Smart Data, Smart Design, Augmented Reality, Gaming’. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Pieter Ballon, ‘Living Labs’ in Robin Mansell and Peng Hwa Ang 
(eds), The international encyclopedia of digital communication and soci- 
ety (John Wiley & Sons 2015). 
24 Clara Kuindersma, ‘De Openbare Ruimte Als Proeflab Voor 
Nudging’ (2018) Stadszaken . 
25 Large objects combining the functions of cameras, information 
signs, signposts, antennas, advertising spaces and video screens. 
analysis, and a weather station.26 These technologies con- 
tinuously captured and generated data. Other types of data 
were also collected and stored, including crime statistics, the 
amount of beer sold, and trash collected per week. All of these 
data were (and likely still are) stored in a database that can 
be utilised through data analysis techniques. Data that was 
captured and collected included: image data from the video 
feed (with blurred faces), the number of people approaching 
and moving away from Stratumseind, people density on the 
street, persons’ walking patterns, the total number of peo- 
ple, stress levels in people’s voices, the nationality and home- 
town of the visitors (based on smartphone subscription data 
received from Vodaphone), the average sound level on the 
street, petty, moderate and serious crime levels on the street 
(based on police statistics), the number of tweets with data 
relating to Stratumseind (e.g. a bar on the street), the percent- 
age difference of beer ordered by the Stratumseind establish- 
ments (weekly), volume of garbage collected from Stratum- 
seind (weekly), tons of glass from the street collected (weekly), 
the number of cars parked in certain car parks in the centre 
of Eindhoven, the temperature, wind speed and direction, and 
the amount of rainfall per hour. Note that data pertaining to 
wifi tracking, tweet sentiment analysis, or visitors’ national- 
ity and hometown is only collected at an aggregate level (and 
the unique identifiers captured through wifi tracking are said 
to be anonymised). On this basis, the SLL actors conclude that 
the level of aggregation is sufficient for these data to be con- 
sidered anonymous.27 In fact, throughout the lifespan of the 
SLL sub-projects, there was no sign on the street that would 
notify citizens of the various activities happening there.28 
The SLL consisted of a growing number of sub-projects with 
diverse but intertwined actors and goals, ranging from crime 
prediction ( CityPulse ), community policing ( Trillion ) and com- 
munity building ( Stratumsepoort ) to de-escalating people’s be- 
haviour via light ( De-escalate ).29 CityPulse and De-escalate were 
the two biggest and most long-lasting sub-projects with po- 
tentially the highest impact on privacy and, as such, we will 
examine them further. 
2.1. CityPulse: predictive policing 
CityPulse was a project developing a system for detection of 
deviant behaviour and atmosphere on the street, taking place 
from 2015 to the end of 2017. Some of the world’s biggest ICT 
companies, such as Atos (funded by IBM for this project) and 
Intel, were parties to it. Other actors included the Eindhoven 
municipality, the police, and a few smaller, local technology 
companies. Employing a variety of sensors on the Stratum- 
26 Several of these technologies, including the video cameras, 
sound sensors and lighting technology, were developed for the 
SLL , either by multinational technology companies (Atos, Intel, 
Philips) or smaller local businesses (Vinotion, Sorama), some- 
times in co-operation with Dutch universities (Technical Univer- 
sity Eindhoven). 
27 Peter de Graaf, ‘Een biertje met Big Brother erbij op Stratum- 
seind’ De Volkskrant (23 November 2015). 
28 At the moment that the authors last checked, in August 2019, 
there were still no signs notifying the data capture taking place on 
the Stratumseind street. 
29 ‘The Stratumseind Pilot’ (n 17). 
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seind street and social media analysis, the CityPulse system 
aimed to create ‘a powerful picture of the street and help au- 
thorities better predict and react to situations and de-escalate 
them before they develop.’ 30 
In particular, this project employed video cameras (with 
blurred faces), sound sensors and sound cameras with em- 
bedded analytical capabilities, as well as data created by other 
sensors, such as temperature, wind speed and rainfall, and 
data gathered from weekly statistics. The CityPulse system 
thus supposedly knew how many people were walking or bik- 
ing around on Stratumseind at any time of the day, which 
bar is the most crowded, how fast persons are moving and 
who has a suspicious walking pattern.31 The system also per- 
formed sentiment analysis of tweets that related to the Stra- 
tumseind street – for example, a tweet that was posted from 
the physical location on the street or mentioned chosen ‘Stra- 
tumseind keywords’, such as the street name, a bar on the 
street or a famous bartender there. 
The system was designed to analyse all of these types of 
data, looking for anomalies in data patterns, which could then 
be cross-referenced against other gathered data sources. For 
example, the video cameras of the CityPulse system had an 
embedded capability of tracking walking patterns. As such, 
the software could single out an individual with a ‘suspicious 
walking pattern’ on the street. Such a suspicious walking pat- 
tern could refer to someone walking up and down the street 
numerous times at a slow pace, indicating the possibility of 
a thief.32 If additional data sources would confirm the likeli- 
hood of an incident, the system would alert the regional po- 
lice control room ( regionale toezicht ruimte ), giving the police 
an opportunity to make better informed decisions on any ac- 
tion on the Stratumseind street that might be required.33 An- 
other example would be, when the CityPulse system would de- 
tect an ‘escalated atmosphere’ potentially soon requiring po- 
lice presence. The police would be alerted through an applica- 
tion (app), first requiring human authorisation but acting au- 
tonomously when fully developed, representing a direct link 
between the SLL and the police. The app would have four pos- 
sible notifications or ‘buttons’: ‘nothing wrong’, ‘everything 
alright’, ‘backup needed’ and ‘high risk situation’.34 The City- 
Pulse system could also adapt the lighting colour and levels on 
the street (a technology developed in the De-escalate project, 
which is discussed in the following paragraph). As such, it can 
be considered a type of predictive policing (that is, a ‘polic- 
30 Atos, ‘CityPulse - Using Big Data for Real Time Incident 
Response Management’ (2015) < https://atos.net/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/06/atos- ph- eindhoven- city- pulse- case- study.pdf> 
accessed 23 March 2019. 
31 Reinier Kist and Wouter van Noort, ‘Het Misdrijf Is Al Ontdekt 
Voor Het Gepleegd Is’ NRC (22 August 2015). 
32 Albert H Seubers, ‘CityPulse Eindhoven - Netherlands’ (2015) 
< https://www.euroforum.nl/media/filer _ public/2015/04/20/ 
albert _ seubers _ v13 _ atos _ city _ pulse _ presentation _ april _ 2015. 
pdf> accessed 16 September 2020. 
33 Atos, ‘Intelligent City Management’ (2015) 
< https://atos.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ 
atos- ph- eindhoven- city- pulse- case- study.pdf> accessed 23 
March 2015. 
34 It is unclear to the authors what the difference between ‘noth- 
ing wrong’ and ‘everything alright’ is. 
ing strategy or tactic that develops and uses information and 
advanced analysis to inform forward-thinking crime preven- 
tion’),35 with a focus on making aggregate predictions relating 
to times and places of crimes.36 The system was thus seen as 
a predictive, preventative and an ancillary tool for the police 
in its role for crime and order maintenance in the city. 
2.2. De-escalate: nudging the atmosphere through light 
De-escalate was a project developing a special lighting sys- 
tem with the purpose of influencing and diffusing ‘escalated’ 
mood and behaviour through ‘dynamic lighting scenarios’ in 
public space, such as on the Stratumseind street, or in small- 
scale indoor settings, such as prisons, psychiatric wards and 
help desks.37 It ran from 2014 to 2018 and was led by re- 
searchers from the Technical University of Eindhoven (TU/e) 
and Philips, a large Dutch technology company from Eind- 
hoven, which designed and provided the lighting system. 
Other parties to the project include Eindhoven municipality, 
the police, and smaller local technology companies. 
The De-escalate project has been described as an intelligent 
lighting system to control emotion.38 It experimented with the 
effect of interactive lighting design in ‘de-escalation’ of ag- 
gressive behaviour, based on psychological pathways through 
which exposure to dynamic lighting could defuse escalating 
behaviour. In other words, the goal was to produce more ‘so- 
cial’ and less aggressive behaviour, particularly through the 
use of light in relation to attention and (self-)awareness.39 Lit- 
erature in the field of psychology shows, for instance, that dim 
and warmer colour light is associated with lower arousal and 
that exposing people to pulsating orange light at slow fre- 
quencies leads to relaxing breathing rhythms.40 Directed or 
bright light can, according to de Kort, heighten self-awareness, 
whereas darkness can trigger feelings of anonymity.41 The 
awareness of the loss of anonymity, when one is in spotlight, 
35 Craig D Uchida, ‘A National Discussion on Predictive Polic- 
ing: Defining Our Terms and Mapping Successful Implementation 
Strategies’ (2009). 
36 Rosamunde van Brakel, ‘Pre-Emptive Big Data Surveillance and 
Its (Dis)Empowering Consequences: The Case of Predictive Polic- 
ing’ in Bart van der Sloot, Dennis Broeders and Erik Schrijvers (eds), 
Exploring the Boundaries of Big Data (Amsterdam University Press 
2016) This type of predictive policing has been called ‘predictive 
mapping’ – identifying when and where crimes may take place 
based on aggregate-level analysis. PredPol is the most famous ex- 
ample, making predictions about possible future crime hotspots. 
37 This project run from 2014 to 2018 and was led by researchers 
from the Technical University of Eindhoven (TU/e) and Philips, a 
large Dutch technology company from Eindhoven, which designed 
and provided the lighting system. Other parties to the project in- 
clude Eindhoven municipality, the police, DITTS and smaller tech- 
nology companies. 
38 Yvonne AW de Kort, ‘Spotlight on Aggression’ (2014) ILI 2014 
10. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Karin CHJ Smolders, Yvonne AW de Kort and Pierre JM Cluit- 
mans, ‘A Higher Illuminance Induces Alertness Even during Office 
Hours: Findings on Subjective Measures, Task Performance and 
Heart Rate Measures’ (2012) 107 Physiology & Behavior 7. 
41 Yvonne AW de Kort, ‘Light on and in Context’ (2015) 
< https://pure.tue.nl/ws/files/8575906/Kort2015.pdf> accessed on 
16 September 2020. 
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may turn a person’s attention to their inner states and traits, 
and prompt them to examine their personal norms and en- 
gage in better self-regulation.42 
Within this project the Stratumseind environment was ex- 
plored, Stratumseind visitors were profiled in order to find 
out what causes aggression and escalation on Stratumseind 
and how such behaviour can be measured, and, furthermore, 
to explore the possibilities for dynamic light designs, which 
could reduce these escalation/aggression levels.43 The project 
made use of analysis of the data of incidents in the past, ‘open 
data’ and social media data, trying to find correlations with 
all kinds of potentially influencing factors on people’s stress 
levels (such as weather or results of a football match).44 With 
the use of such data analysis predictions were made about the 
stress levels that put the lighting system in motion, aiming 
to proactively keep stress levels at ‘acceptable levels’ . 45 What 
these ‘acceptable levels’ are was not further specified. 
The project thus aimed to provide insights into human be- 
haviour and deliver lighting schemes applicable and effective 
in real-time conditions in order to de-escalate behaviour on 
the street. In this sense, it can be seen as a nudging tool or, 
more broadly, a tool that influences people’s behaviour and, 
potentially, impairs persons’ autonomy. 
There were two key terms used throughout the project: es- 
calation and atmosphere. The first term, ‘escalated behaviour’, 
was used in a very broad sense within this sub-project and the 
SLL in general, referring to all types of behaviour of persons 
who in some way lose self-control, including screaming, get- 
ting abusive, aggressive or crossing other behavioural bound- 
aries that a person would otherwise not cross.46 Escalation, 
then, refers to ‘an increase in severity of aggressive means 
used in a given conflict’.47 The second key term used was at- 
mosphere. This term was seen as being of value, as the police 
and the security staff on the Stratumseind street often refer 
to it and use it in order to evaluate the general situation on 
the street and anticipate people’s behaviour. Since aggression 
(connected to the broader concept of escalated behaviour) is 
behaviour that is strongly dependant on context (including 
crowding, noise and temperature), socio-physical character- 
istics of environments can coerce behaviour in dynamic but 
patterned, and thus predictable ways.48 Most often, aggres- 
sion and escalation occur not because they were intention- 
ally planned, but because people respond to perceived stress, 
become ignited by autonomic arousal and anger and in this 
process break personally held norms and revert to things they 
42 Ibid. 
43 Indr ̇e Kalinauskait ̇e, ‘Measuring Stratumseind Experience: De- 
Escalate Stratumseind’ (PDEng rapport 2014). 
44 H den Ouden and AC Valkenburg, ‘Smart Urban Lighting’ in A. 
Nighten (ed), Real projects for real people (Volume 3, The Patching 
Zone 2013). 
45 Ibid. 
46 de Kort (n 38). 
47 Zeev Winstok, Zvi Eisikovits and Gideon Fishman, ‘Towards the 
Development of a Conflict Escalation Model: The Case of Israeli 
Youth’ (2004) 33 Journal of Youth and Adolescence 283. 
48 Indr ̇e Kalinauskait ̇e and others, ‘Atmosphere in an Urban 
Nightlife Setting: A Case Study of the Relationship between the 
Socio-Physical Context and Aggressive Behavior’ (2018) 59 Scandi- 
navian Journal of Psychology 223. 
might not do otherwise. De-escalate researchers thus wanted 
to affect the ‘atmosphere’ on the Stratumseind street in order 
to de-escalate aggression. They defined ‘atmosphere’ as ‘peo- 
ple’s attitudes, mood, behaviours and interactions with one 
another as well as with their immediate environment’.49 It 
was thus seen as a characteristic of social context that could 
be transformed into measurable data, coloured through inter- 
actions with other visitors.50 In other words, atmosphere was 
seen as an important indicator of the risk of incidents 51 as 
well as a proxy for influencing persons’ behaviour. 
3. The perennial question: personal or 
non-personal data? 
Based on this description of the two sub-projects, we will at- 
tempt to answer the question, whether data protection law 
applies to the processing of data within the SLL . In other 
words, do the actors within the SLL project process personal 
or non-personal data? 
As seen from the description of the initiative, most of the 
data collected and processed by the living lab seem – at first 
blush – non-personal. This is connected to the fact that the 
SLL and similar types of initiatives try to ‘datafy’ public space 
and the people there through its sensors.52 For this reason, 
they processes a lot of data that first and foremost relates to 
the environment (i.e. ‘environmental data’), such as data relat- 
ing to the weather, amount of beer sold, sound and crowding 
levels. In this section, we will examine whether data collected 
and processed within the SLL , which we will call ‘ SLL data’, can 
nevertheless be considered personal. 
The GDPR defines personal data as any information that re- 
lates to someone who is identified or identifiable on the basis 
of that data (Art. 4(1) GDPR). An identifiable natural person is 
‘one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular 
by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification 
number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more 
factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, 
economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person’ 
(ibid.). This definition is further explicated by the Article 29 
Working Party (Art. 29 WP or WP29) 53 in Opinion 4/2007 on 
the concept of personal data 54 and, more recently, in the case 
49 Ibid. 228. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 229. 
52 Somia Belaidouni and Moeiz Miraoui, ‘Machine Learning Tech- 
nologies in Smart Spaces’, Ubicomm 2016: The Tenth International 
Conference on Mobile Ubiquitous Computing Systems, Services and Tech- 
nologies (2016). 
53 In the wake of the GDPR, the Art. 29 WP has been replaced 
by the European Data Protection Board (EDPB). The latter has en- 
dorsed all the documents issues by the Art. 29 WP. We continue 
to refer to the Art. 29 WP for the documents it has authored. See, 
EDPB, ‘Endorsement 1/2018’ (2018). 
54 Even though the Opinion concerns the concept of personal 
data in the Data Protection Directive (DPD), it is still significant 
after the adoption of the GDPR, as the new regime does not affect 
the concept of personal data (see Case C-434/16 Peter Nowak v. 
Data Protection Commissioner (2017) ECLI:EU:C:2017:994, Opinion 
of Advocate General Kokkot, p. 3). 
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law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).55 Ac- 
cording to WP29, the notion of personal data is very broad, 
covering all information which may be linked to an individual. 
While the CJEU has not been unequivocal in endorsing such a 
broad approach,56 it implicitly confirmed it in the 2017 Nowak 
Judgment.57 
According to WP29 58 – and endorsed by the CJEU in Nowak 
– the notion of personal data has three elements: (1) any infor- 
mation; (2) relating to; (3) an identified or identifiable natural 
person.59 ‘Any information’ is used to reflect the aim of data 
protection law to ‘assign a wide scope to that concept’,60 po- 
tentially encompassing all kinds of information (e.g. objective 
and subjective, sensitive and not sensitive).61 The more inter- 
esting question then concerns the second and third element. 
In the following sections we will examine both the ‘relating to’ 
and ‘identifiability’ elements of personal data, applying them 
to the data collected within the SLL . 
3.1. Information ‘relating to’ a person 
According to WP29, information can ‘relate to’ a person in con- 
tent, purpose, or result.62 In some situations, the relationship 
between the information and the individual is quite obvious. 
This is generally the case, when the information relates to a 
person in content – that is, it is about a particular person, such 
as one’s Twitter account name, one’s walking pattern and the 
level of one’s intoxication. In other cases, where the relation- 
ship with the person is indirect, the link may not be as self- 
evident. This is often the case when information relates to a 
person in purpose , that is ‘when the data are used or are likely 
to be used … with the purpose to evaluate, treat in a certain 
way or influence that status or behaviour of an individual’.63 
In this case, the information might relate to an object (e.g. the 
value of one’s bicycle), a process or an event (e.g. one’s par- 
ticipation in a fight). Finally, information can relate to a per- 
son in result , when its ‘use is likely to have an impact on a 
certain person’s rights and interests’.64 This impact does not 
need to be ‘major’. In fact, it is ‘sufficient if the individual may 
be treated differently from other persons as a result of the pro- 
55 E.g. Case C-582/14, Patrick Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutsch- 
land, [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:779 (hereinafter Breyer); Joined Cases 
C-141/12 and C-372/12 YS and MS v. Minister voor Immigratie, Inte- 
gratie en Asiel, (2104), ECLI:EU:C:2014:208 (hereinafter YS and MS). 
56 See YS and MS (n 55). 
57 Case C-434/16, Peter Nowak v. Data Protection Commissioner 
(2017), ECLI:EU:C:2017:994 (hereinafter Nowak). 
58 While the Art. WP 29 Opinions are not formally binding, its 
Opinions hold much authority in member states and provide com- 
prehensive guidelines for data controllers as to how they should 
apply the concept of persona data in practice. 
59 The WP 29 in its Opinion 2007 actually distinguished ‘natural 
person’ as a fourth element but as this is a rather straightforward 
legal term, we will not consider it as a separate element. 
60 Nowak (n 57), para. 34. 
61 WP 29 Opinion 2007. Nowak, para. 34. See also, Case C-131/12, 
Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González (2014), ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 
(hereinafter Google Spain). 
62 Art. 29WP, Opinion 4/2007, p. 11. 
63 Ibid. 10. 
64 Ibid. 11. 
cessing of such data’.65 As such, it is ‘not necessary that the 
data “focuses” on someone in order to consider that it relates 
to [her]’.66 
Furthermore, the relationship in regard to purpose and re- 
sult will occur not only when the data is already used, but also 
where it is likely to be used with the purpose or effect of im- 
pacting people ‘taking into account all the circumstances sur- 
rounding the precise case’.67 The intended and unintended 
impact or likelihood of impact of data processing thus need 
to be taken into account too. Consequently, whether a par- 
ticular information relates to an individual is context-specific 
and cannot be answered in an absolute manner.68 The same 
piece of data can be considered as relating to a person in one 
case and not relating to a person in another case depending 
upon a number of factors (e.g. the entity in possession of the 
data, purposes of processing, current and future technological 
and organizational context of processing). This analysis of ‘re- 
latability’ can be said to have been upheld in the CJEU Nowak 
judgement.69 
Let us now apply the above considerations to the data col- 
lected within the SLL . For instance, in the case of trying to 
detect a thief, where the goal is to single them out and alert 
police officers to them, data on walking patterns and ‘image 
data’ with blurred faces from the video feed will likely be anal- 
ysed. Both of these types of data relate to the alleged thief in 
content. However, considering the fact that the surveillance 
within the SLL is aimed at all visitors, most of which will not 
be (alleged) thieves, we consider that this type of monitoring 
and data collection will be more of an exception rather than a 
rule. 
Following Purtova, we consider that most if not all of the 
data processed in a smart environment, such as the SLL , re- 
lates to a person at least in purpose or impact.70 This is so 
because one of the key goals of the SLL – a common goal of 
many smart city and living lab projects – is to process data 
with the purpose of adapting the environment and influenc- 
ing persons’ behaviour there. As such, SLL data can be seen 
as constituting information that is used or is likely to be used 
with the purpose to evaluate and influence the behaviour of 
persons on the street. 
For instance, if Bart and Marloes – a couple – are having a 





69 Nowak (n 57), pp. 35, 56; in the 2016 judgement YS and oth- 
ers, the CJEU did not follow the Opinion of WP29 on the matter. In 
this judgment concerning exams transcripts, the CJEU interpreted 
‘information relating to’ narrowly, as information about an indi- 
vidual. However, the Court later reversed its stand on the matter 
in the 2017 Nowak judgment. In Nowak, the CJEU stated that the 
notion ‘personal data’ potentially encompasses any information, 
as long as it relates to the data subject, that is where the informa- 
tion is linked to a particular person ‘by reason of its content, pur- 
pose or effect’. The Court explicitly noted the contradiction with 
YS and others, thus de facto overruling the older judgment. The 
legally binding position of the CJEU, at least since Nowak, is thus 
in line with the position of the WP29. 
70 Purtova (n 6). 
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ken glass, the SLL surveillance system would capture the im- 
age (with blurred faces) and the sound of them yelling and 
breaking glass. The CityPulse and De-escalate systems might 
determine that this is a ‘low risk’ situation on the street and 
would only turn on the special lighting technologies with the 
aim of de-escalating their behaviour, rather than notifying 
the police about it. While ‘image data’ from the video feed 
do relate to Bart and Marloes in content , this is not necessar- 
ily the case for the broken glass noise, general stress level 
of voices and crowding levels that together trigger the nudg- 
ing response. These latter data do not relate to the couple in 
content, but they do in its purpose , which is to ‘de-escalate’ 
the couple’s behaviour. Further, these same data also relate to 
other bystanders who will be affected by the nudging mea- 
sures. These data relate to them in effect . Thus, while the SLL 
might also process data relating to persons in content, the fo- 
cus can be said to be on data that relates to persons in purpose 
and, potentially, in effect. 
3.2. Identifiability: a broad but not unlimited notion 
3.2.1. The Stratumseind Living Lab and the limits of identifia- 
bility? The second key part of the definition of personal data 
is the notion of ‘identified or identifiable’ (Art. 4(1) GDPR). 
Whereas ‘identified’ refers to a person who is known (that is, 
distinguished in a group), ‘identifiable’ relates to a person who 
is not identified yet, but where identification is possible. More- 
over, identification can be direct or indirect. A person is iden- 
tified directly by, for instance, reference to a name, sometimes 
in combination with additional information if the name is not 
unique. A person can be identified indirectly through ‘unique 
combinations’ of not unique identifiers that allow the individ- 
ual to be singled out in a group.71 The notion of ‘identified or 
identifiable’ is thus very broad. 
Recital 26 GDPR adopts a test of reasonable likelihood of iden- 
tification by the controller or by another person, referring to 
objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time 
required for identification and taking into account the state 
of art of technology at the time of processing. According to 
WP29, a ‘purely hypothetical possibility’ of identification is in- 
sufficient to meet the standard of reasonable likelihood.72 This 
test thus has a higher threshold than the ‘relating to’ element 
of the definition, where mere likelihood suffices. Besides the 
costs and the amount of time required for identification, the 
WP29 expanded the factors that should be taken into consid- 
eration by including: 
• the intended explicit or implied purpose of processing: 
when ‘the processing … only makes sense if it allows iden- 
tification of specific individuals and treatment of them in 
a certain way’,73 the availability of tools of identification 
should be presumed reasonably likely; 
• the risk of organisational dysfunctions (e.g. breaches of 
confidentiality duties) and technical breaches (e.g. data 
breaches); 
• measures to prevent data identification (i.e. to maintain 
anonymity) are of importance as a means of avoiding pro- 
71 Art. 29WP, Opinion 4/2007, p. 13-14. 
72 Art. 29WP, Opinion 4/2007, p. 15. 
73 Ibid. 16. 
cessing of personal data altogether, rather than a fulfil- 
ment of data security obligations under the now repealed 
Data Protection Directive.74 
The CJEU also had an opportunity to consider the mean- 
ing of ‘indirect’ identification involving ‘all the means likely 
reasonably to be used’ in Breyer, a case concerning dynamic 
IP addresses.75 In this case, the Court examined whether the 
possibility for the German state to combine the dynamic IP ad- 
dress with additional identifying information held by the in- 
ternet service provider (ISP) constituted a means likely reason- 
ably to be used.76 It determined that even though German law 
does not generally allow the transmission of such information 
between the ISP and the state, such transmission is allowed 
in the case of issues such as cyber-attacks.77 Furthermore, it 
considered that such a combination was not practically im- 
possible, in the sense that it would require a disproportionate 
effort in terms of time, cost and man-power.78 It concluded 
that identification was reasonably likely, so that dynamic IP 
addresses constituted personal data. Consequently, both the 
WP29 and CJEU interpret ‘identifiability’ very broadly, allow- 
ing for rather onerous steps to constitute ‘means reasonably 
likely to be used’.79 
So, does the SLL process data of identified or identifiable 
persons? Getting back to the lovers’ quarrel between Bart and 
Marloes, one can argue that images (with blurred faces) and 
the sound of them yelling and breaking glass are not direct 
identifiers. The same is true a fortiori for other environmen- 
tal data, that is data primarily relating to the environment, 
such as weather conditions, general sound and crowding lev- 
els, even though indirect identifiability based on these data is 
likely more difficult than based on video footage. However, and 
crucially, the point here is that identifiability is not needed for 
the SLL ’s purposes. In the case of the De-escalate project (i.e., 
de-escalating behaviour through light), even though its light- 
based nudging system is primarily aimed at Bart and Marloes 
it does not target them directly (and hence does not identify 
them); instead it affects everyone present on the street. In fact, 
the whole nudging system makes perfect sense without iden- 
tification or the need for identifiability. That is, even if individ- 
uals are not identifiable, they may be nudged in this or that 
way for this or that purpose. If Bart and Marloes are indeed 
calmed down by the lighting scenario and end up kissing in 
a secluded alley – in other words, if the nudging works – then 
their identifiability is not needed at all; neither now nor later.80 
A similar assessment can be made in regard to a higher risk 
situation detected by the SLL system, such as a fight likely to 
break out, which would merit the deployment of the police on 
74 Ibid. 
75 Breyer (n 55). 
76 Lynskey (n 5). 
77 Breyer, para. 47. 
78 Ibid., para. 46. 
79 Lynskey (n 5). 
80 Cf. Schreurs and others who comes to the same conclusion 
in regard to behavioural biometric profiling; Wim Schreurs and 
others, ‘Cogitas, Ergo Sum. The Role of Data Protection Law and 
Non-Discrimination Law in Group Profiling in the Private Sector’ 
in Mireille Hildebrandt and Serge Gutwirth (eds), Profiling the Euro- 
pean Citizen: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives (Springer 2008) 243. 
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the street. In this case, the purpose of the CityPulse project will 
be to detect a risky situation that might otherwise remain un- 
detected through the regular (‘deaf and dumb’) CCTV operated 
by the police. The goal here is to detect a ‘bad atmosphere’, in 
which a fight is likely to break out, so that the CityPulse system 
can alert the police ahead of time, allowing them to arrive on 
the street more quickly and have a pre-emptive effect on per- 
sons ready to pick a fight. In order to achieve this goal, the 
CityPulse would generally rely upon the same types of data as 
mentioned in the above example of the lovers’ quarrel and the 
De-escalate project. Consequently, that in order to pre-empt a 
fight through atmosphere detection, identification is also not 
needed.81 
In both of these cases no direct identifiers are at play, 
meaning that no personal data seems to be processed. How- 
ever, is it possible to argue otherwise? Could individuals 
nonetheless be considered identifiable? 
3.2.2. Auxiliary or additional identifying information One way 
to render the individual identifiable is by adding additional in- 
formation so as to be able to single them out, what has been 
called auxiliary information.82 Such auxiliary information de- 
pends on a number of technical factors. For instance, the 
level of granularity of the profiles used for nudging purposes, 
such as the number of data points they rely upon. As Purtova 
argues, the type of advanced machine learning technology 
commonly at play nowadays relies upon high-dimensional 
databases – databases that construct objects through an im- 
portant number of features (or data points), which can lead to 
the identifiability of individuals through the matching of the 
features between the data points or databases at play.83 Such 
cross-referencing allows for the identifiability of individuals: 
since individuals are constructed on the basis of many fea- 
tures, one can compare two or three databases and rapidly 
spot these unique constructions of features that stand out.84 
One should keep in mind however that comparing databases 
also relies upon additional social or organisational factors 
such as the extent of sharing taking place among the various 
databases. 
Does the SLL context provide for such additional identi- 
fying information? On a general level, one can argue that 
this is the case insofar as the functioning of the SLL is pred- 
icated upon the interoperability of the databases of the vari- 
ous actors involved (cf. PPP), which in principle enables their 
81 The situation would be different if a fight would nevertheless 
break out on the street and the perpetrators would not be appre- 
hended immediately. Then the police would resort to its own high- 
resolution, non-blurred video feed from the CCTV (and eventually 
also post these images in the news and on social media, asking 
other citizens to help them identify them, as is common practice). 
However, this is a different matter and a distinct data processing 
situation, with which the present paper is not concerned. 
82 Lorenzo Dalla Corte, ‘Scoping Personal Data: Towards a Nu- 
anced Interpretaton of the Material Scope of EU Data Protection 
Law’ (2019) 10 European Journal of Law and Technology 1. 
83 Luc Rocher, Julien M Hendrickx and Yves-Alexandre De Mon- 
tjoye, ‘Estimating the Success of Re-Identifications in Incomplete 
Datasets Using Generative Models’ (2019) 10 Nature Communica- 
tions; Purtova (n 7). 
84 Rocher, Hendrickx and Montjoye (n 83). 
cross-referencing.85 Even if the databases used by the SLL do 
not technically qualify as high-dimensional, they certainly do 
operate on a high number of data points, and such cross- 
referencing could allow for the identifiability of individuals 
in the databases. This is particularly the case relating to wifi
tracking or phone subscription data mentioned in Section 2 . 
Even though these data points are collected at an aggregate 
level, when the various databases wherein they are contained 
are cross-referenced, the singling out of the individuals at 
stake cannot be excluded. Furthermore, in certain specific 
cases, the SLL might make use of additional identifying data, 
which have a closer link with individuals. For instance, the SLL 
features the possibility of sentiment analysis of tweets that re- 
late to the Stratumseind street (e.g. tweets that mention the 
word ‘Stratumseind’ or that mention a bar on the street), as 
well as the collection of various behavioural biometric data 
(such as walking patterns). One can imagine a case in which 
Marloes would post a tweet with a picture of herself and Freek 
(tagging themselves in the post) making up after a quarrel, ei- 
ther mentioning the street by name or having the location em- 
bedded in the metadata of photo. Our quarrelling lovers would 
thus be quickly and easily individually identifiable (possibly by 
name, if they would use their real names on Twitter). 
Another way of adding information is by inferring informa- 
tion. In the case of the video footage where people’s faces are 
blurred, it might nonetheless be possible to infer the identity 
of the people (at least, in the sense of singling out). In order to 
infer such information, the SLL would need to rely upon the 
interoperability of databases, according to which inference is 
possible because of the existence of additional information. 
These considerations point to the possibility that the data 
processed by the SLL is personal, however, they hinge upon 
a number of hypothetical factors that cannot be answered in 
advance. In any case, it is worth re-emphasising that the SLL 
does not need personal data in order to function properly; in- 
stead, it is meant to operate on the basis of non-personal data. 
3.2.3. Identifiability and profiling Another way to approach 
the issue of identifiability is through a broader, socio-technical 
perspective, by looking at the purpose of processing at stake 
in any particular example.86 As a type of smart environment, 
the functioning of the SLL relies upon a number of data min- 
ing algorithms, which create ‘risk profiles’.87 Think of the four 
‘risk situations’ of the CityPulse system (discussed in 2.1). For 
instance, in the example of the lovers’ quarrel, the SLL al- 
gorithms classify Bart and Marloes as being part of a ‘low 
risk profile’, which warrants nudging actions through light. In 
other words, the SLL is predicated on profiling operations. Be- 
fore we can discuss the particular type of profiling taking place 
within the SLL , the concept of profiling merits some discus- 
sion. 
85 See, Maša Gali ̌c, ‘Surveillance, Privacy and Public Space in the 
Stratumseind Living Lab: The Smart City Debate, beyond Data’ 
(2019) Ars Aequi 570. 
86 On the social aspect of identifiability, see Miranda Mourby and 
others, ‘Are “Pseudonymised” Data Always Personal Data? Impli- 
cations of the GDPR for Administrative Data Research in the UK’ 
(2018) 34 Computer Law and Security Review 222. 
87 Belaidouni and Miraoui (n 52). 
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The process of profiling relies among other things upon 
data mining (i.e., the extraction of knowledge), prediction, and 
decision-making.88 Profiling can thus be said to coincide with 
data analytics. In other words, profiling is a partly automated 
process used to find correlations in large data sets in order to 
build classes or categories of characteristics, which can then 
be used to generate profiles of individuals and groups, but also 
of places, events or whatever is of interest.89 An individualised 
(or personalised) profile is built entirely on the basis of data 
pertaining to one individual. In practice, group profiles, which 
represent an individual only insofar as she is part of a group 
(i.e. she shares the characteristics of the group), are far more 
common.90 Individual or group profiles are thus a way of re- 
constructing an individual through a number of features (such 
as walking speed or routines), rendering her knowable through 
data mining algorithms.91 This serves to predict individuals’ 
future behaviours and to take decisions affecting them on this 
basis.92 Finally, applying a profile can be defined as ‘the pro- 
cess of identifying and representing a specific individual or 
group as fitting a profile and of taking some form of decision 
based on this identification and representation.’ 93 
While the question as to whether profiling amounts to the 
processing of personal data has been hotly debated in data 
protection scholarship, it has as yet not been definitively set- 
tled. 
On the one hand, Schreurs et al. have argued that profiling 
does not involve the processing of personal data, when the 
data used to build the profile does not relate to an identifi- 
able individual.94 In this sense, profiling can be distinguished 
in three steps: (1) processing (personal and/or non-personal) 
data; (2) creating a profile; and (3) applying the profile. Ac- 
cording to this position, if the first step does not process per- 
sonal data, the rest of the steps in the profiling operation can- 
not be considered to involve (the processing of) personal data 
either. Schreurs et al. take the case of behavioural biomet- 
ric data such as the way that a shopping trolley is driven in 
a supermarket as a means to infer the type of customer at 
play (e.g. hurried, higher purchasing power). This type of data 
does not allow for the identifiability of the individuals push- 
ing the trolley so that the profiling operation will escape the 
reach of data protection law.95 The Irish data protection Com- 
missioner has adopted a similar decision in the case of facial 
88 Mireille Hildebrandt, ‘From Data to Knowledge: The Challenges 
of a Crucial Technology’ (2006) 30 Datenschutz und Datensicher- 
heit 548; Francesca Bosco and others, ‘Profiling Technologies and 
Fundamental Rights. An Introduction’, Profiling technologies in prac- 
tice: Applications and Impact on Fundamental Rights and Values (Wolf 
Legal Publishers 2015); Bart Custers, The Power of Knowledge: Ethical, 
Legal, and Technological Aspects of Data Mining and Group Profiling in 
Epidemiology (Wolf Legal Publishers 2004). 
89 Bosco and others (n 88). 
90 Hildebrandt (n 88). 
91 David-Olivier Jaquet-Chiffelle, ‘Reply: Direct and Indirect Pro- 
filing in the Light of Virtual Persons’, Profiling the European citizen: 
cross-disciplinary perspectives (Springer 2008). 
92 Mireille Hildebrandt, ‘Defining Profiling: A New Type of Knowl- 
edge?’ in Mireille Hildebrandt and Serge Gutwirth (eds), Profiling 
the European citizen: cross-disciplinary perspectives (Springer 2008). 
93 Bosco and others (n 88). 
94 Wim Schreurs and others (n 80) 243. 
95 Ibid. 
detection technology for advertising purposes (i.e., inferring 
mood, age, gender, etc. on the basis of facial features with- 
out actually identifying people), considering it non-personal 
data.96 In the context of affinity profiles, Wachter has also de- 
fended a similar view by arguing that an affinity profile built 
on the basis of anonymous data will not constitute personal 
data even though sensitive information can be inferred from 
it.97 These views leave out the fact that profiling is a contin- 
uous process based on the creation and subsequent applica- 
tion of profiles, and that ‘while the distinction between the 
two may be analytically salient, in practice the two phenom- 
ena intermingle.’ 98 In other words, these views argue that it 
is possible to artificially distinguish between the creation and 
application of a profile and that on this basis the creation of 
profiles based on non-personal data would escape the scope 
of data protection law. 
On the other hand, others have adopted a holistic view of 
profiling in order to argue that even on the basis of profiles 
not containing identifying information, profiling does amount 
to the processing of personal data. This is the position of the 
Council of Europe (CoE) Recommendation on profiling.99 The 
main argument here is that even if based on an anonymous 
profile, the application of the profile to specific individuals en- 
tails per se that these individuals are identifiable. Put simply, 
one needs to be able to single out a person in order to apply 
the profile at all. Similarly, Bosco et al. define the application 
of the profile to individuals as ‘the process of identifying and 
representing a specific individual or group as fitting a profile 
and of taking some form of decision based on this identifica- 
tion and representation.’ 100 These authors argue that a strict 
distinction between the three profiling steps is artificial. On 
the contrary, all of the steps should be seen as ‘inseparable, 
[and as such] they must all be considered part of personal data 
processing’.101 This is very much in line with the reasoning of 
WP29 concerning the purpose of the processing operation as 
a key parameter of identifiability. If the processing only makes 
sense insofar as it allows for the treatment of a data subject in 
a certain way (which is precisely what is at stake with profil- 
96 Irish Data Protection Commissioner, ‘Annual Report’ 
(2017) 16. See, however, the opinion of the Dutch AP con- 
cerning advertisement columns with cameras capable of 
facial detection, which states that personal data is pro- 
cessed, although without much discussion on how identi- 
fiability is established; Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens, ‘AP In- 
formeert Branche over Norm Camera’s in Reclamezuilen’ (2018) 
< https://www.autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/nl/nieuws/ap- 
informeert-branche-over-norm-camera’s- 
reclamezuilen#subtopic-1727 > accessed 27 March 2019. 
97 Sandra Wachter, ‘Affinity Profiling and Discrimination by Asso- 
ciation in Online Behavioural Advertising’ (2020) 35 Berkeley Tech- 
nology Law Journal 1, 54–55. 
98 Hildebrandt (n 92) 19. 
99 Council of Europe, ‘The Protection of Individuals with Regard 
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data in the Context with Re- 
gard to Automatic Processing. Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)13 
and Explanatory Memorandum’ (2010). 
100 Bosco and others (n 88). 
101 Council of Europe (n 99) para. 57; similarly, Hildebrandt has also 
argued that while the construction and application of the profile 
can be distinguished for the sake of analytical clarity, in practice 
this distinction collapses (see Hildebrandt (n 92)). 
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ing), then the identifiability of the individuals is implied by its 
very purpose.102 Nevertheless, there is as yet no binding legal 
decision confirming this position. 
4. Profiling and nudging in the Stratumseind 
Living Lab: from individuals and groups to 
atmospheres 
Following the above discussion on issues of identifiability and 
profiling, we will now examine the specific type of profiling in 
the SLL in more detail. On the one hand, it can be argued that 
the profiling performed in the SLL does not process personal 
data, since the data used to build the profiles relates to the 
environment rather than to identifiable individuals. On the 
other hand, it can be argued that the SLL processes data re- 
lating to identifiable individuals, as identification is implied 
by the very purpose of the profiling operation – to affect per- 
sons’ behaviour on the Stratumseind street. However, in the 
case of the SLL , persons are not to be affected as specific in- 
dividuals or even as algorithmic groups, but only indirectly as 
a part of the general atmosphere on the street. We argue that 
a new type of profiling operations in smart environments is 
found in the SLL , what we call ‘atmospheric profiling’, which 
puts an additional strain on the notion of personal data. 
The ideas behind the SLL are deeply rooted in the notion of 
atmosphere. While attempts to affect the atmosphere, espe- 
cially for purposes of boosting sales, are nothing new,103 trying 
to affect it via sophisticated digital technologies in the (par- 
tially) public sector is a more recent development. The goal of 
the De-escalate project was to create ‘good atmospheres’ on the 
Stratumseind street in order to de-escalate potential aggres- 
sion. Similarly, a part of the goal of the CityPulse project can 
be described as detecting ‘bad atmospheres’ on the street in 
order to deploy the police in a more efficient way. Atmosphere 
was seen as being constituted, among others, from data relat- 
ing to people’s attitudes, mood, behaviours and interactions 
with one another as well as with their immediate environ- 
ment (see Section 2.2 ).104 The SLL is therefore based on the de- 
tection of a positive or negative atmosphere , with the intention 
of directly affecting this atmosphere – rather than any partic- 
ular individuals – so as to reduce aggression and violence. In 
other words, the SLL is based on the creation of profiles of at- 
mospheres – atmospheric profiles – which are then translated 
into ‘everything alright’ or ‘high risk’ profiles within the City- 
Pulse project. Atmosphere can thus be described as a proxy to 
only indirectly affect and nudge people, who are reduced to a 
constitutive element of the atmosphere on the Stratumseind 
street. 
102 Art. 29WP, Opinion 4/2007, p. 16. 
103 See the literature on ‘atmospherics’; e.g. Kotler Philip, ‘Atmo- 
spherics as a Marketing Tool’ 48; Salomão Alencar de Farias, Edvan 
Cruz Aguiar and Francisco Vicente Sales Melo, ‘Store Atmospher- 
ics and Experiential Marketing: A Conceptual Framework and Re- 
search Propositions for An Extraordinary Customer Experience’ 
(2014) 7 International Business Research 87. 
104 Kalinauskait ̇e and others (n 48). 
By shifting the focus away from individuals to the broader 
environment and atmosphere, atmospheric profiling can be 
said to put an additional burden on the notion of identifi- 
ability and, consequently on the notion of personal data. If 
the target of the atmospheric profile is to influence the at- 
mosphere on the street, this seems to refute arguments in 
favour of identifiability based on the purpose of the process- 
ing; that is, processing, which only makes sense, insofar as it 
allows for the treatment of a particular data subject in a cer- 
tain way.105 Of course, while atmospheric profiling directly af- 
fects atmospheres, its underlying goal is to indirectly affect 
(that is, nudge) people – their mood, behaviour, and interac- 
tion – in a particular place. After all, the term atmosphere in 
contemporary vernacular use refers to the distinctive ‘influ- 
ence’ of a place on persons.106 However, even if we accept that 
the purpose of this profiling is to indirectly affect persons’ be- 
haviour in a certain way, no particular individuals are or need 
to be singled out, so that no individuals are identified. Con- 
sequently, identifiability through purpose does not apply. In 
other words, whereas usual types of profiling practices lead to 
identification in terms of purpose (at least under certain in- 
terpretations), the same cannot be held in relation to this new 
type of profiling practice is concerned. From the perspective 
of profiling, data protection law would not apply to the ma- 
jority of the data processing taking place within the SLL and 
similar smart city initiatives,107 confirming what the SLL ac- 
tors have been claiming. As Kanters, the SLL project manager, 
put it: ‘In the absence of legislation in the Netherlands, we 
have drawn up our own data principles. If you want to build a 
house in the Netherlands, books full of rules apply before any 
stone has been laid. There is nothing that applies to the use of data. 
You can reason then, it is not forbidden, so just go ahead.’ 108 
Yet, should this indeed be so? 
As already mentioned, in order for persons to be affected, 
they do not need to be identified by name or another unique 
identifier, or even singled out from the group, confirming once 
again that ‘[e]ven when individuals are not “identifiable”, they 
may still be “reachable”’.109 Perhaps luckily then, nudging 
based on atmospheric profiles, which does not single out per- 
sons, does not seem to work very well. At least, this seems 
to be the case within the SLL .110 This is likely – at least par- 
105 Art. 29WP, Opinion 4/2007, p. 16. 
106 ‘Atmosphere’ ( Merriam-Webster online dictionary ) < https://www. 
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/atmosphere > . 
107 With the accepted exception of wifi-tracking and facial recog- 
nition. 
108 ‘In Eindhoven Herkent Een Algoritme Vechtpartijen’ 
( Privacy Web , 2019) < https://www.privacy-web.nl/artikelen/ 
in- eindhoven- herkent- een- algoritme- vechtpartijen > accessed 
22 May 2020. Emphasis added. 
109 Solon Barocas and Helen Nissenbaum, ‘Big Data’s End Run 
around Anonymity and Consent’ in Julia Lane and others (eds), Pri- 
vacy, Big Data, and the public good: frameworks for engagement (Cam- 
bridge University Press 2014). 
110 This is at least the case in De-escalate project, which has not 
resulted in any tangible de-escalating effects on aggressive be- 
haviour. Tinus Kanters, the SLL project leader, stated: ‘We thought 
that that the atmosphere could be influenced in this way [with 
dynamic lighting scenarios] but this was not the case in practice. 
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tially – connected to the way in which (manipulative) nudging 
works: trying to covertly subvert another person’s decision- 
making power through exploitation of the person’s cognitive 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities.111 Consequently, nudges that 
are applied to everyone in the same way (such as the light- 
ing scenarios in De-escalate ), lack the key characteristic re- 
quired to exploit someone’s cognitive vulnerabilities: knowing 
what they are and how to leverage them. However, it should 
be noted that ICTs are well-suited to facilitate nudging that 
would allow for ’fine-grained microtargeting’, that is hyper- 
nudging ,112 which target and exploit individual vulnerabilities, 
making them much more difficult to resist. In the case of 
hypernudging, one could thus speak of affecting individuals, 
meaning that data protection law would much more likely ap- 
ply. 
One could thus imagine that in order to improve the func- 
tioning of the SLL, profiling might move towards creating more 
specific and fine-grained atmospheres. For instance, creating 
a profile of the atmosphere of a specific corner on the Stra- 
tumseind street, where a smaller or more specific group of 
persons would gather, so that more granular data would be 
collected, making the atmospheric profile applicable to a set 
of persons in more narrowly delineated place. There are good 
chances that this type of more granular atmospheric profil- 
ing would allow for the identifiability of individuals. In any 
case, the distinction between nudging that targets individ- 
ual vulnerabilities and nudging that does not, is certainly not 
clear cut. And even where nudging does not target identifi- 
able persons, there are nonetheless important risks for a wide 
variety of rights and freedoms, which data protection law is 
meant to protect.113 The most obvious risk here concerns the 
right to privacy or private life as found in Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. This is so because 
nudging (hyper-nudging even more so) poses risks for auton- 
omy, a key argument for why we value privacy,114 one that is 
recognised by the European Court of Human Rights. For in- 
stance, when the environment is intentionally designed so as 
to covertly subvert individual decision-making in particular 
directions, we can speak of manipulative nudging, which by- 
passes autonomous decision-making.115 Furthermore, in view 
of the scarce information concerning the specific functioning 
of smart city projects provided to the public, it remains un- 
clear how the public could tell (and thus object), when the 
In any case, it is hardly measurable.’ Diede Hoekstra, ‘Netwerk van 
Hypermoderne Camera’s Op Stratumseind in Eindhoven Gaat Poli- 
tie Helpen’ ( ED , December 2017) < https://www.ed.nl/eindhoven/ 
netwerk- van- hypermoderne- camera- s- op- stratumseind- in- 
eindhoven- gaat- politie- helpen%7B ∼%7Da1e8acee/ > . 
111 Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler and Helen Nissenbaum, ‘On- 
line Manipulation: Hidden Influences in a Digital World’ (2019) 4 
Georgtown Law Technology Review 1. 
112 Karen Yeung, ‘“Hypernudge”: Big Data as a Mode of Regulation 
by Design’ (2017) 20 Information, Communication and Society 118. 
113 See Arts. 24, 35 and Recital 75 GDPR. 
114 Gali ̌c (n 85); Marjolein Lanzing, ‘“Strongly Recommended” Re- 
visiting Decisional Privacy to Judge Hypernudging in Self-Tracking 
Technologies’ (2019) 32 Philosophy and Technology 549. 
115 Not all nudging is manipulative; for an excellent discussion of 
nudging, manipulation, persuasion and coercion see Susser and 
others (n 111). 
nudging might be targeting individuals, thus invoking the pro- 
tection of data protection law. The reach of data protection 
law, as the most obvious legal framework to regulate smart 
city-types of initiatives, is thus very limited in smart city ini- 
tiatives such as the SLL , where increasing amounts of envi- 
ronmental data are collected for the purpose of atmospheric 
profiling. 
5. Conclusion 
The goal of this contribution was to explore whether and 
to what extent data protection law could apply to smart 
city-types of initiatives focused on safety and security, more 
specifically, whether the data processed within them can be 
considered personal. It did so by examining a concrete exam- 
ple of a smarty city-type of initiative – the Stratumseind Liv- 
ing Lab ( SLL ) in the Netherlands. This is a worthwhile endeav- 
our, as smart city initiatives (try to) affect and reshape both 
places and persons, thus posing important risks to the enjoy- 
ment of our fundamental rights and freedoms, such as privacy 
and data protection. A clear regulatory framework that would 
regulate such initiatives is thus needed. 
Applying the four-folded definition of personal data (de- 
fined as any information relating to an identified or identi- 
fiable natural person) to the SLL shows that the crux of the 
problem revolves around the issue of identifiability. First, the 
majority of the data collected within the SLL does not concern 
the individuals as such. Rather, it relates to algorithmic groups 
of persons (for instance, walking patterns suggesting thieves) 
and, predominantly, to the environment itself (e.g. data about 
the weather, air quality, sound and crowding levels). Looking 
at identifiability from a technical perspective, this raises the 
question, whether there is sufficient additional data available 
that would render the individuals identifiable. Second, in re- 
lation to smart city-goals concerning nudging based on pro- 
filing, we can conclude that the SLL is generally not inter- 
ested in identifying and targeting specific individuals. Rather, 
the focus is on the management and nudging of individuals 
conceived as a multiplicity – a combination of the environ- 
ment, persons and all of their interactions. This points to a 
two-fold issue concerning profiling. On the one hand, it adds 
to and further complicates the discussions around the ques- 
tion of whether profiling constitutes a form of personal data 
processing simply because of its purpose to affect individu- 
als (in the case of the SLL , non-identified persons). This is- 
sue, which has its proponents and opponents, has not yet 
been settled. On the other hand, it also implies a novel type 
of profiling – atmospheric profiling – which tries to indirectly 
affect persons by affecting the general atmosphere on the 
street (rather than singling out individuals). As such, this type 
of profiling does not seem to constitute a type of personal 
data processing. This might explain why in practice many ac- 
tors of smart city projects consider that their data processing 
operation involve non-personal data thereby creating a legal 
vacuum. 
So, what is the way forward? Surely, these pervasive and 
risky data-driven technologies can’t be left unregulated. 
A valid consideration at this point would be to question, 
whether the notion of personal data should be stretched so 
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far as to cover situations of data processing, where the iden- 
tification of individuals (at least by singling them out) is not 
a goal at all, but where the intention is to manage or nudge 
people as a multiplicity. This is not a novel proposal. More 
than a decade ago already, scholars had argued for a shift 
from personal data protection towards data protection tout 
court .116 That is, the application of data protection law to each 
processing of data that has potential negative consequences 
for our rights and freedoms irrespective of whether the data 
processed qualify as personal. Similarly, some scholars have 
casted doubt on the actual level of protection that the re- 
quirement of identifiability affords to data subjects in prac- 
tice,117 whereas others have proposed to replace the require- 
ment of identifiability with that of ‘reachability’.118 Such per- 
spectives are consistent with the overall objective of data pro- 
tection law, which is to protect individuals’ rights and free- 
doms in the context of the processing of data.119 Yet, others 
have warned against such ‘over-stretching’ of data protection 
law, positing that it should not try to become a law of every- 
thing and thus of nothing.120 But if data protection were to be 
discarded in such cases, it still remains unclear which type of 
(secondary) law should take on this role. Should it be left to 
municipal ordinances or another type of administrative law 
having to do with public order and safety? Another possibility 
could be to employ self-regulatory instruments going beyond 
the bounds of data protection law; that is, instruments that 
can assess the acceptability of these types of projects with- 
out being bound by the distinction between personal and non- 
personal data. A notable example are impact assessments, in 
particular surveillance impact assessments,121 or in the con- 
text of increasingly smart data driven environments, so-called 
‘care robot impact assessments’.122 However, the pitfalls of 
such self-regulatory initiatives have long been underscored, 
especially concerning the large amount of discretion that they 
afford.123 
116 Paul De Hert and Serge Gutwirth, ‘Regulating Profiling in a 
Democratic Constitutional State’ in Mireille Hildebrandt and Serge 
Gutwirth (eds), Profiling the European Citizen: Cross-Disciplinary Per- 
spectives (Springer 2008) 289. 
117 Worku Gedefa Urgessa, ‘The Protective Capacity of the Crite- 
rion of ‘Identifiability Under EU Data Protection Law’ (2016) 2 Eu- 
ropean Data Protection Law Review. 
118 Barocas and Nissenbaum (n 109). 
119 This was stated more clearly in the data protection Directive 
than in the GDPR. Art. 1(1) of the former stated that its goal is to 
“protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, 
and in particular their right to privacy with respect to the process- 
ing of personal data.”2. 
120 Purtova points specific attention to the resource intensive com- 
pliance regime of the GDPR. See, Purtova (n 6). 
121 David Wright, Michael Friedewald and Raphaël Gellert, ‘Devel- 
oping and Testing a Surveillance Impact Assessment Methodol- 
ogy’ (2015) 5 International Data Privacy Law 40. 
122 E Fosch-Villaronga, ‘Creation of a Care Robot Impact Assess- 
ment’ (2015) 9 International Journal of Humanities and Social Sci- 
ences 1913. 
123 Concerning these criticisms in the context of data protection 
impact assessments and the GDPR, see Raphaël Gellert, ‘The Ar- 
ticle 29 Working Party’s Provisional Guidelines on Data Protection 
Impact Assessment’ (2017) 2 European Data Protection Law Review 
1, 216–217. 
Finally, to echo Lynskey, even if data protection were to un- 
doubtedly apply to smart environments, it may not be of much 
assistance to those whose fate is affected by activities within 
and connected to smart cities and living labs.124 Indeed, be- 
yond the issue of personal data, a number of other hurdles 
remain, which stand in the way of smooth implementation 
of data protection law. In particular, one can point to a num- 
ber of dualisms that have been sustained rather than replaced 
during the GDPR adoption process. Beyond the distinction be- 
tween personal and non-personal data, these include the dis- 
tinction between data controller and data processor, and be- 
tween processing for private or law enforcement purposes just 
to name a few.125 Critically, these distinctions appear to be out 
of touch with the organisational and technological reality of 
contemporary smart cities organised within complex public- 
private partnerships, potentially preventing a successful ap- 
plication of data protection law to an increasing number of 
loci , where it is meant to apply. 
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